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NOTE
The Validity of Ordinances Limiting Condominium Conversion
In 1974, the New York Times ran a front-page story about the
dilemma of an elderly woman who lived in a Washington, D.C.,
apartment building that was being converted into a condominium.
On a limited budget, she faced the choice of either finding a new
place to live in the tight Washington housing market or paying $2000
down and $422.50 in monthly installments for the same one-bedroom apartment she had been renting for $ 155.00 per month. 1 The
woman's situation is not unusual: a federal study2 estimates that
owners have recently converted 60,000 rental apartment units to condominiums,3 and real estate experts expect many more conversions
in the future. Landlords and speculators find conversion profitable,
but tenants and housing officials blame it for exacerbating shortages
of rental housing,4 for displacing tenants from long-established
homes,5 and for adding to the cost of housing. 6 These complaints
l. Rugaber, Condominium Trend Cuts Rental Markel, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1974, at 1, col.

5.
2. I U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HUD CONDOMINIUM/
COOPERATIVE STUDY III-10, -11 (1975) [hereinafter cited as HUD REPORT]. The report estimated that an additional 25,000 units were converted to condominiums during the five-year
period ending in 1974. Id. at III-30.
3. In the interest of brevity, this Note will use condominium to refer to both condominiums
and cooperatives. Basically, the owner of a condominium owns in fee a single dwelling unit in
a multiple dwelling and also has some joint interest in the land and other common facilities in
the complex. The owner of a cooperative is a shareholder of a corporate entity that owns the
entire multiple dwelling complex; the shareholder is entitled to occupy one of the dwelling
units, to share common facilities, and to participate in the management of the complex. For a
brief discussion of the differences between the forms of ownership, see I HUD REPORT, supra
note 2, at IV-7, -8.
4. The data to date do not seem to justify the conclusion that conversions have caused a
significant decline in the rental housing stock. As of 1975, only 125,000 rental units had been
converted out of a total rental housing stock of 25 million units. During the peak year for
conversions, they reduced the rental housing vacancy rate only 0.1%. See 1 HUD REPORT,
supra note 2, at V-30. While the impact in New York City exceeded that for the entire country, local figures are stiff not alarming. By 1975, 52,000 units in New York had been converted
out of a total rental housing stock of2.2 million units. See 2 HUD REPORT, supra note 2, at C2. Thus, the percentage of rental units converted in New York by 1975 amounted to just 2.4%
of the rental stock; the corresponding national statistic was only 0.5%. Of course, conversions
may affect particular segments of some housing markets more strongly. In the Borough of
Manhattan, for example, cooperatives represent nearly 7% of the rental housing stock, the
"highest concentration of cooperative conversions in the country." Id. at C-9, -13. Most conversions have been of the highest rent buildings, undeniably reducing the number of luxury
apartments available. This experience supports concern that conversions might reduce the
vacancy rate in other markets in the future. See Note, Tenant Protection in Condominium Conversions: The New York Experience, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 978, 981 (1974).
5. The somewhat sketchy data on involuntary tenant displacement seem to bear out these
concerns. The HU.D Report includes three case studies of actual conversions. In the first,
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have prompted several state and local legislatures to regulate the
conversion of apartment buildings into condominiums.7 Conversion
laws fall into two categories: consumer protection laws that merely
require an owner to disclose fully his plans to convert, but actually
protect the condominium purchaser more than the tenant; 8 and
stricter laws that prohibit conversions unless the owner or the housing market satisfies certain conditions. The first group is almost certainly constitutional,9 but the second group's legitimacy is less clear.
The more limiting regulations are stern indeed. A few jurisdictions have explicitly prohibited conversions, 10 and many have imtwo thirds of the tenants were displaced. In the second, an extended period of conversion (two
years) prevented a meaningful count of displaced tenants. In the third, a long conversion
period also made accounting difficult, but two years after the conversion only 42% of the original tenants had purchased units. 2 HuD REPORT, supra note 2, at B-1, -8, -28, -50, -70. A New
York Times article on conversions reported that real estate experts believe that no more than
25% of tenants typically purchased their units. Rugaber, supra note 1, at 14, col. 4.
6. This problem also seems to be a real one. See Rugaber, supra note I, at 14, col. 1. The
three H{IJJ Report cases indicated monthly cash outlays of $400.00, $270.00, and $791.00 for
units that had rented for $307.00, $220.00, and $495.00 respectively before conversion. 2 HUD
REPORT, supra note 2, at B-26, -48, -49, -69.
One building owner reported that while resale of rental buildings to new landlords might
typically bring a price six times the annual rental income, conversion to condominiums would
yield a total sales price of about ten times the rental income. Rugaber, supra note I, at 14, col.
I. The three apartment complexes examined in the HUJJ Report were sold just before the
conversion for $3.6 million, $7.5 million and $2.8 million. (Each was purchased by a developer who intended to convert, which might make these "before" prices unrealistically high.)
The estimated prices of the condominium units in these complexes totaled $5.1 million, $13.6
million, and $4.0 million. 2 HUD REPORT, supra note 2, at B-13, -24, -35, -47, -68. While
these figures certainly do not represent profit, and at least one of the converted buildings appeared likely to fall short of selling all its units, the figures indicate at least a potential for large
profits, especially where the owner converts directly, rather than selling to a developer. For
another financial analysis of an actual conversion, see 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE§ 3A.04 (1965 & Supp. 1978).
7. By 1975, all states had passed laws recognizing the condominium form of ownership and
in some way regulating condominiums. Six states had adopted provisions particularly relating
to conversions. See I HUD REPORT, supra note 2, at VI-27 to -117. Municipal ordinances
regulating conversion are quite common. Among the cities with such ordinances are New
York, Chicago, Washington, D.C., Palo Alto, and San Jose.
8. The most common type of statute allows conversions but protects tenants from abrupt
evictions and shields buyers from deceptive selling practices. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 718.503 (West 1979); Condominium Property Act§ 22, ILL. Rev. STAT. ch. 30, § 322 (1974);
VA. CODE§ 55-79.90 (Supp. 1979). Some laws regulate the sale of new and converted condominium units, addressing such matters as property reports, escrow arrangements, warranties,
management, resale, initial costs and anticipated expenses, closing costs and procedures, security deposits, and restrictive covenants. Other laws regulate building condition, cost of needed
repairs, eviction of tenants, and the rights of tenants to purchase their units if they wish. For a
listing of condominium regulations by state, see I HUD REPORT, supra note 2, at VI-27 to 117.
9. For a discussion of their constitutionality, see C. RHYNE, W. RHYNE & P. AscH, MuNICIPALITIES AND MULTIPLE RESIDENTIAL HOUSING: CONDOMINIUMS AND RENT CONTROL
13-16 (1976) (National Institute of Municipal Law Officers Research Report No. 158) (hereinafter cited as RHYNE].
10. Some communities enacted temporary moratoria while studying the conversion problem. See, e.g., D.C. Reg. 74-26 (1974). These temporary measures have typically been followed by permanent restrictions that do not ban conversions outright, but permit them only
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posed restrictions so severe as to amount to a prohibition. Marin
County, California, for example, prohibits conversion if the rate of
rental vacancies in the county dips below five percent or if multifamily accommodations form less than one fourth of the total housing
stock. 11 When the rental vacancy rate in Washington, D.C., drops
below three percent, only high rent apartments may be freely converted; other conversions require the written consent of "a majority
of the heads of household actually residing in such housing accommodation." 12 New York enacted a comprehensive and widely discussed conversion law in 1974. 13 Unlike many statutes requiring
only that tenants consent to a conversion, the New York law required that 35% of the tenants agree to purchase their units within
one year of the start of the conversion effort. 14 If too few agreed, the
owner could not reinitiate the plan for eighteen months. 15 The
owner could not evict any nonpurchasing tenant for two years from
the date of the first offering, 16 and could not subject the tenants to
"unconscionable increases beyond ordinary rentals for comparable
apartments" during that two-year period. 17
under certain conditions. See, e.g., D.C. CODE§ 5-1281 (Supp. V 1978)'. Stopgap measures
designed to preserve the status quo while permanent measures are studied have long been held
to be a valid planning tool. See, e.g., Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477,234 P. 381,
(1925); Almquist v. Town of Marshan, 245 N.W.2d 819 (Minn. 1976).
. 11. Marin County, Cal., Ordinance No. 2122 (Sept. 24, 1974).
12. D.C. CODE§ 5-128l{b)(l)(B) (Supp. V 1978). (The District of Columbia allows conversion of high rent buildings at any time. D.C. CODE§ 5-128I(b)(2) (Supp. V 1978),) The
San Francisco ordinance permits conversion if35% of the tenants approve. 3 P. ROHAN & C,
BERGER, THE CONDOMINIUM REPORT 7 (1975).
13. Act of June 15, ch. 1021, § 2-a, 1974 N.Y. Laws 1629 (1974) (expired July 1, 1977), A
conflict between the houses of the state legislature over statutory terms prevented reenactment
after the statute expired. See N.Y. Times, May 15, 1977, § 1, at 42, col. 3; N.Y. Times, June
24, 1977, § A, at 28, col. 2; N.Y. Times, June 30, 1977, § D, at 16, col. I. A portion of the New
York City Rent Stabilization Act, however, reiterated several of the provisions of the slate law,
including the requirement of filing a plan with the state attorney general, and the requirement
that 35% of the tenants agree to purchase if the plan provides for evictions. NEW YORK, N.Y.
ADMIN. CODE§ YY5 l-6.0(c) (1975). A new state law, similar to the expired one, was passed in
July, 1978, for the major New York City suburban counties. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW§ 352-33
(McKinney Supp. 1978).
14. Act of June 15, 1974, ch. 1021, § 2-a, I, 1974 N.Y. Laws 1629 (expired July I, 1977).
15. Act of June 15, 1974, ch. 1021, § I, 2-a, 1, (ii), 1974 N.Y. Laws 1629 (expired July 1,
1977).
16. Act of June 15, 1974, ch. 1021, § 2, 2-a, I, (iii), 1974 N.Y. Laws 1629 (expired July 1,
1977).
17. Act of June 15, 1974, ch. 1021, § 2, 2-a, (iii), 1974 N.Y. Laws 1629 (expired July I,
1977). Although tenant groups pressured the state legislature to increase the purchase requirement to 51%, the 35% requirement effectively prevented most conversions. The real estate
industry, on the other hand, sought to relax the regulations, claiming that conversions contribute to a stable urban middle class, foster building upkeep through pride in ownership, and
increase the municipal tax base. N.Y. Times, March 13, 1977, at 30, col. I; N.Y. Times, April
8, 1977, § A, at 15, col. I. See also Proposed Act lo Protect Purchasers of Condominium Housing
Units: Hearings on S. 3658 and S. 4047 Before the Subcomm on Housing and Urban Affairs of
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1974)
(statement of David Clurman) [hereinafter cited as Condominium Hearings].
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Regulations as extensive as the Marin County, District of Columbia, and New York laws may force a land owner to forego a highly
profitable use of his land. Therefore, such laws will assuredly face
courtroom attacks 18 under a variety of constitutional theories. In
particular, land owners who thumb through the Constitution's portfolio of limitations on government activity may be tempted by any of
three plausible assertions:
I. The regulations exceed the state's police power, denying due process guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
2. The regulations take private property without just compensation,
contrary to the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
3. The regulations that require tenant consent to conversions improperly delegate state power, denying due process guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 19

This Note evaluates those assertions, concluding that the first two do
not square with modem Supreme Court precedent, but that the third
18. At least one court has overturned a conversion ordinance as "an abridgement of the
plaintiff's rights in violation of both the Federal and State Constitution." Rothman v. Borough
of Fort Lee, No. 1-21679-73 P.W. (Bergen County Ct., N.J., June 17, 1974).
In Bridge Park Co. v. Borough of Highland Park, 113 N.J. Super. 291, 273 A.2d 397 (1971),
the Superior Court, Appellate Division, held that the municipality's zoning law could not prohibit the conversion of a garden apartment complex into a condominium. The court reasoned
that the state legislative grant of zoning power gave the borough no right to regulate forms of
ownership of real property.
A third case, City of Miami Beach v. Arlen King Cole Condominium Assn., 302 So. 2d 777
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), held that the change from rental apartments to the condominium
form of ownership, absent other significant changes, was not a change in use sufficient under
the municipal zoning ordinance to trigger the termination of the building's nonconforming use
permit. See also Zussman v. Rent Control Bd., 367 Mass. 561, 326 N.E.2d 876 (1975).
19. These, of course, are not the only grounds for a challenge. RHYNE, supra note 9, at 6971, discusses the possibility that conversion limitations may be challenged on equal protection
grounds. As Rhyne points out, an equal protection challenge is not likely to succeed. It would
be difficult indeed to prove the lack of a rational basis for distinguishing between the owners of
new condominiums and the owners of apartment buildings undergoing conversion when displacement of existing tenants is one of the major problems being addressed.
Building owners might also contend that conversion laws impair their freedom of contract.
This somewhat archaic constitutional doctrine, which enjoyed some success during the era of
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), should not be terribly troublesome now, notwithstanding the suggestion of the court in Rothman v. Borough of Fort Lee, No. 1-21679-73 P.W.
(Bergen County Ct., NJ., June 17, 1974) discussed in note 18 supra. The Supreme Court
recently discussed the contract clause in Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 240
(1978):
The Language of the Contract Clause appears unambiguously absolute . . . . The
Clause is not, however, the Draconian provision that its words might seem to imply. As
the Court has recognized, "literalism in the construction of the contract clause . . . would
make it destructive of the public interest by depriving the State of its prerogative and selfprotection."
Since at least 1921, the Court has not seen any merit in discussing the contract clause as an
issue distinct from due process in cases involving interference with private contractual obligation. See Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 198 (1921).
This Note does not discuss questions of state law because of the narrow value of such a
discussion. State law, for example, might preempt local conversion ordinances, see RHYNE,
supra note 9, at 71-72, and state constitutional provisions about taking, impairment of contracts, delegation of power, or due process differ from their federal counterparts, see, e.g., state
constitutional provisions cited in note 47 infra.
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assertion - of an improper delegation - may accurately characterize some conversion regulations.
I.

CONVERSION REGULATIONS AND THE POLICE POWER

The Supreme Court has recognized, under the rubric of police
power, that states have authority to protect the health, safety, morals,
and general welfare of the public.20 Police power extends, however,
only to laws rationally related to a legitimate government objective;
beyond such objectives, due process requirements restrict state regulation.21 Landlords, faced with restrictive conversion laws, may contend that such laws exceed the perimeters of police power. No court
has ruled .on this question, but decisions upholding laws that limit
the rent a landlord may charge offer a persuasive analogy. 22
The Supreme Court first upheld rent control laws in 1919.23 In
response to the widespread rent gouging, overcrowding, and harsh
evictions after World War I, Washington, D.C., had passed a rent
control law.24 Although the Court at that time generally opposed
any government regulation of private property rights, 25 it deemed
the rental housing market "clothed . . . with a public interest so
great as to justify regulation by law."26 Yet that clothing was not
especially ample. Justice Holmes writing for the majority, stressed
the emergency conditions that prompted the law:
The provisions [were] made necessary by emergencies growing out of
the war resulting in rental conditions in the District dangerous to the
public officers, employees and accessories, and thereby embarrassing
the federal government in the transaction of the public business. As
20. See E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER§§ 2-3 (1904). The Supreme Court acknowledged
the existence of this power in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge Co., 36 U.S. 419 (1837).
21. Substantive due process requires even a higher standard of justification when a law
deprives persons of a "fundamental right." Such a right is one explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. In light of the Supreme Court's decisions on fundamental rights, it
clearly would not consider the right to convert an apartment building to a condominium to be
fundamental. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974); San Antonio lndep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973); Lindsay v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
22. This analogy was first discussed in RHYNE, supra note 9.
23. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921). Block, a tenant in a building owned by Hirsch,
held over after the expiration of his lease despite Hirsch's request that he vacate. Block
claimed that Hirsch had not complied with the rent control law enacted less than three months
before the lease expired. Hirsch declined to follow the recent law's eviction procedures, claiming instead that the law was invalid. 256 U.S. at 136. The Court reconsidered the determination of the court of appeals that the District of Columbia rent law "attempted to authorize the
taking of private property not for public use and without due process." 256 U.S. at 153.
24. The Food Control and the District of Columbia Rents Act of 1919, ch. 80, §§ 101-122,
41 Stat. 298 (1919).
A brief history of conditions in the rental housing market during and immediately after
World War I, and a discussion of the legislative responses to those conditions appears in E.
DRELLICH & A. EMERY, RENT CONTROL IN WAR AND PEACE (1939).
25. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-2 (1978).
26. 256 U.S. at 155.
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emergency legislation, [it] is to end in two years unless sooner repealed.27

The Court plainly suggested that the law would not have been justified in the absence of an emergency. 28 In Chastleton Corp. v. Sinc!air, 29 the Court reaffirmed the need for emergency conditions to
justify rent control. 30
The emergency requirement, however, has outlived its usefulness. 31 It made sense in 1919 as an expression of a constitutional
27. 256 U.S. at 154. Although the Court declared that it need not accept a legislative
determination as true, it found that a declaration of emergency conditions familiar to the legislature "is entitled at least to the greatest respect." 256 U.S. at 154.
28. 256 U.S. at 157. In Marcus Brown Holding Co., v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921), a
companion case with similar facts, the Court upheld the New York rent law. The Supreme
Court next dealt with rent control in Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegal, 258 U.S. 242 (1922),
which concerned a tenant's refusal to pay the higher rent stipulated in a lease renewal executed
before, but effective after, the imposition of rent controls. The Court held that Block and
Marcus Brown Holding Co. controlled the case. 258 U.S. at 248. It reasoned that:
The warrant for this legislative resort to the police power was the conviction on the
part of the state legislators that there existed in the larger cities of the State a social emergency, caused by an insufficient supply of dwelling houses and apartments, so grave that it
constituted a serious menace to the health, morality, comfort, and even to the peace of a
large part of the people of the state. That such an emergency, if it really existed, would
sustain a resort, otherwise valid, to the police power for the purpose of dealing with it
cannot be doubted, for, unless relieved, the public welfare would suffer in respects which
constitute the primary and undisputed, as well as the most usual, basis and justification
for exercise of that power.
258 U.S. at 245. In plainer terms than the previous cases, this decision indicated that the
required emergency is a social one, a housing shortage gravely threatening the general public
welfare, rather than a war or other catastrophe.
29. 264 U.S. 543 (1924).
30. The plaintiff, a landlord, sought to prevent the enforcement of an order of the District
of Columbia rent commission reducing rents in his building. In particular, he contended that
the emergency conditions used to justify the rent control law had disappeared by 1922. Justice
Holmes wrote the opinion reversing the judgment of the lower court, holding that without a
housing emergency the law could not stand, and remanding the case to the lower court for
determination of whether the emergency still existed on the date of the Commission order. 264
U.S. at 549. The Court noted that "[i]f about all that remains of war conditions is the increased cost of living, that is not in itself a justification of the act." 264 U.S. at 548. Shortly,
thereafter, the court of appeals considered the conditions in light of Chastleton and held that
''the emergency had ended, and that therefore there was no constitutional basis for the legislation . . . ." Peck v. Fink, 2 F.2d 912, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
31. Judge Friendly pointed out the demise of the emergency requirement in Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2<! 560, 567 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970):
The constitutionality of rent control legislation seems not to have been directly passed
upon by the Supreme Court since the cases arising during World War II and the housing
shortage consequent thereon . . . . While in those cases the Court naturally stressed the
war and post-war emergencies, we have no doubt that it would sustain the validity of rent
control today. The New York City Rent Control Law contains an impressive recital of
the conditions deemed to call for its enactment . . . . The time when extraordinarily exigent circumstances were required to justify price control outside the traditional public
utility areas passed on the day that Nebbia v. New York ... was decided.
Some courts, however, have presumed the continued existence of the emergency requirement.
See, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1974); Albigese v.
Jersey City, 127 N.J. Super. 101,316 A.2d 483 (Law Div.), mod!fied, 129 N.J. Super. 567,324
A.2d 577 (App. Div.) (1974); Seasons Realty Corp. v. City of Yonkers, 80 Misc. 2d 601, 363
N.Y.S.2d 738 (1975). Some commentators also make this assumption. Rhyne, for example,
states: "Rent control ordinances, in order to be valid, must be based upon the existence of an
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philosophy that generally opposed government regulation, 32 but the
Court has since abandoned that philosophy in favor of a broader
view of the power to regulate. Government, in the exercise of police
powers, can now place many restrictions on property owners.33 Justice Roberts expressed the modem view in Nebbia v. New York: 34
The Fifth Amendment, in the field of federal activity, and the Fourteenth, as respects state action, do not prohibit governmental regulation for the public welfare. They merely condition the exertion of the
admitted power, by securing that the end shall be accomplished by
method consistent with due process. And the guaranty of due process,
as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have
the real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. 35

With particular relevance for rent control laws, the Nebbia Court
then noted:
The thought seems nevertheless to have persisted that there is something peculiarly sacrosanct about the price one may charge for what he
makes or sells, and that, however able to regulate other elements of
manufacture or trade, with incidental effect upon price, the state is incapable of directly controlling the price itself. This view was negatived
years ago. 36
emergency situation. For this reason, most rent control ordinances are prefaced by a declaration stating the existence of an emergency caused by a severe housing shortage necessitating
the enactment of the ordinance." RHYNE, supra note 9, at 78 (footnotes omitted).
32. During this era, the Court struck down regulations limiting the working hours of bakers, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), requiring the use of uniform weights for loaves
of bread, Bums Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924), setting minimum wages for women
and children, Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), setting minimum wages for
persons engaged in certain industries, Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations,
262 U.S. 522 (1923), regulating the price of theatre tickets, Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S.
418 (1927), regulating fees of employment agencies, Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928);
Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917), controlling gasoline prices, Williams v. Standard Oil,
278 U.S. 235 (1929), and controlling the cost of dairy products, Fairmont Creamery v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. l (1927).
33. Two obvious examples of valid burdens upon landowners' use of property are zoning
ordinances, see Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,384 (1927), and subdivision regulations, see, e.g., Blevens v. Manchester, 103 N.H. 284, 286-87, 170 A.2d 121, 123
(1961); Lake Intervale Homes, Inc. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills, 28 N.J. 423, 147 A.2d 28 (1958);
Mansfield & Swett v. West Orange, 120 NJ.L. 145, 198 A. 255 (1938); Pittsburgh v. McNeill,
396 Pa. 73, 74-76, 141 A.2d 596, 597-98 (1959).
34. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
35. 291 U.S. at 525 (footnotes omitted).
36. 291 U.S. at 532. Justice Roberts later stated that "there can be no doubt that, .. the
state may regulate a business in any of its aspects, including the prices to be charged for the
products or commodities it sells." 291 U.S. at 537.
Nebbia also greatly reduced the severity of the requirement that only property "clothed
with a personal interest" warranted regulation:
"Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of
public consequence, and affect the community at large." [quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113, 126 (1877)] Thus understood, "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent
of "subject to the exercise of the police power''; and it is plain that nothing more was
intended by the expression . . . .
The statement that one has dedicated his property to a public use is, therefore, merely
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As the Court became more tolerant of regulation generally, the
emergency requirement became less useful. At least two state courts
have read Nebbia to hold that rent control laws are valid even without an emergency. In Westchester West No. 2 Ltd Partnership v.
Montgomery County, 37 the Court of Appeals of Maryland faced a
challenge to a county's rent control law by several landlords who
contended that the law relied on a "non-existent public emergency
and therefore 'constitute[d] a deprivation of private property without
due process oflaw.' " 38 The Court found that the prevailing housing
shortage provided a rational basis for the law,39 stating that "the
constitutionality of the Montgomery County rent control law does
not depend upon the existence of an emergency shortage in rental
housing."40 The Supreme Court of California, in a lengthy opinion
by Chief Justice Wright, reached a similar conclusion in Birkeefeld v.
City ofBerkeley. 41 Although the court ultimately invalidated Berkeley's rent control law for not providing a reasonable means to accomplish its objectives,42 the opinion analyzed the emergency
requirement in depth and branded it "obsolete.''43 Birkeefeld and
Montgomery County each treated the emergency requirement as primarily a theoretical vehicle the Court had used to uphold vital statutes,44 despite a general hostility to regulatory legislation. In their
view, the passing of that hostility rendered the emergency requirement a mere troublesome vestige. That assessment is persuasive and
finds growing favor among scholarly commentators.45
Thus, rental control laws do not appear to overstep the bounds of
another way of saying that if one embarks in a business which public interest demands
shall be regulated, he must know regulation will ensue.
291 U.S. at 533-34.
37. 276 Md. 448, 348 A.2d 856 (1975).
38. 276 Md. at 451, 348 A.2d at 858.
39. 276 Md. at 454, 348 A.2d at 860.
40. 276 Md. at 463, 348 A.2d at 865.
41. 17 Cal. 3d 129, 550 P.2d 1001, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1976).
42. 17 Cal. 3d at 173, 550 P.2d at 1033, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
43. 17 Cal. 3d at 157, 550 P.2d at 1021, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
44. Their view finds support in the opinion of Justice Douglas, for a unanimous Court, in
Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941):
The standard [employed in earlier price control cases] was that the constitutional validity
of price-fixing legislation, at least in the absence of a so-called emergency, was dependent
on whether or not the business in question was "affected with a public interest." . . . It
was said to be so affected if it had been "devoted to the public use" and if "an interest in
effect" had been granted "to the public in that use." . . . That test, labelled by Mr. Justice
Holmes . . . as "little more than a fiction," was discarded in Nehhia v. New York . . . .
313 U.S. at 245. Olsen overruled Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928), which had held that
states could not regulate the fees of employment agencies.
45. See, e.g., Baar & Keating, The Last Stand ofEconomic Substantive JJue Process-The
Housing Emergency Requirementfar Rent Control, 1 URBAN LAW. 477 (1975); 1977 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 431. Another way of approaching the problem is to define "housing emergency"
less stringently. Courts have considered a low vacancy rate in rental housing to be such an
emergency. See, e.g., Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 120 N.J. Super. 286,328,298 A.2d
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a state's authority to regulate for the welfare of its citizens. The state
has a legitimate interest in assuring adequate housing, and restricting
the rent a landlord can charge is a reasonable way to promote that
interest. The same reasoning should vindicate most condominium
conversion laws as legitimate exercises of the police power. They,
too, limit a landlord's return on his investment to control the cost of
rental housing. In the words of a recent commentator, conversion
regulations resemble rent control laws "not only in the controlling
aspects, but [also] in their underlying objectives."46 That similarity
should preclude successful police-power attacks on conversion statutes.
JI.

CONVERSION REGULATIONS AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE

Limitations on the state's police power are not the only source of
possible objection to statutes regulating condominium conversion.
Landlords may seek to escape the analogy to rent control statutes by
referring to the fifth amendment requirement that land not be
"taken" without compensation.47 They may argue that rent control
laws do not keep a landlord from renting: they merely limit the price
a landlord may charge for rental. Conversion regulations, on the
other hand, prevent landlords from selling individual apartments at
any price. One must confess that the regulations restrict land use
more significantly than do the rent control statutes; nonetheless,
analysis of the jumble of cases construing the takings clause reveals
that conversion laws do not interfere with property rights sufficiently
to require compensation.48
Courts and commentators lack a settled interpretation of the takings clause; the Supreme Court has acknowledged that no "set
formula" will explain all cases.49 Historically, the courts have most
720, 743 (Law Div. 1972). Sharply rising housing costs might also be considered an emergency.
46. RHYNE, supra note 9, at 6-7.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Several state constitutions prohibit the taking or damaging of
property without just compensation. This might be a harder test for the state to meet. See,
e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17; VA. CONST. art. I, § I I.
48. Before any discussion of the taking issue is warranted, it should be clear that the
"right" to convert is a property right. The condominium form of ownership is a recent statutory innovation. The current debate on what constitutes property centers on such nontraditional forms of"property" as government employment and welfare benefits. To maintain that
the statutory right to sell property in a certain form is not a property right would, by implication, cut much more deeply into traditional concepts of property, and wrongly equate the
concept of real property with the statutory rights under conveyancing and recording laws. It
also incorrectly assumes that condominiums could not be created without the enabling acts.
See 4B R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 633.8 (rev. ed. 1979 & Supp. 1979.)
49. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). Some cases look at taking
and police-power regulation as mutually exclusive concepts. A determination that a regulatory act is within the police power, they reason, is sufficient to counter any claim of a taking.
See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928). This is a misleading way of thinking
about the relationship between the police power and the taking problem. Even when the gov-
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often professed allegiance to two divergent standards. 50 The narrower interpretation held that a taking occurs only when a state takes
title to the property - actually or constructively - by a physical
encroachment. Courts used this test to require compensation for
such complete expropriations of property as when the government
flooded private land51 or turned it into a swamp. 52 Early Supreme
Court cases explicitly limited takings to regulations depriving the
owner of all use of the property.53 Obviously, condominium laws do
not meet this strict test. While such regulations do limit an owner's
use of property, the government does not take title to it, physically
encroach upon it, or use it for government purposes.
A second, broader interpretation held that when a regulation impairs the value of property beyond a permissible degree or unreasonably limits the owner's control of its use, the regulators must
compensate the owner. This test achieved its most prominent early
expression in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 54 The Supreme
Court found a fifth amendment taking in a regulation that prevented
the company from exercising its mineral rights because the required
excavation might cause the surface of the land, and the Mahon
house, to collapse. Justice Holmes wrote:
The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. . . . [A] strong public desire to improve the public condition is not
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change. As we already have said, this is
a question of degree - and therefore cannot be disposed of by general
propositions.55

The Mahon test looks at how much the regulation diminishes the
ernment takes title through eminent domain, it must show that it is doing so to further a valid
public purpose. The government may not take a person's land, and put it to a public use,
merely to inconvenience a disfavored property owner. The power of eminent domain is not a
license to run roughshod over private property rights. Conversely, when the state, to protect
the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the public, deprives a property owner of his
property or diminishes the property's value beyond the acceptable limits of Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), see text at notes 54-56 infra, the state's action will require
compensation, even though it is a valid exercise of police power. Mahon itself did not hold
that the state lacked the power to enact the ordinance to protect against land subsidence
(clearly a valid police purpose); it merely held that to do so at such a great cost to the property
owner would constitute a taking. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594
(1962); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Village of Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan, 29 Ohio
St. 2d 39, 278 N.E.2d 658 (1972).
50. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964). For a historical look at
the taking issue, see F. BosSELMAN, D. CALLIES, & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 51-123
(1973).
51. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
52. See United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903).
53. United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 470-71 (1903), Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1871).
54. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
55. 260 U.S. at 415-16.
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value of property, 56 but it does not indicate the degree of diminution
required to constitute a taking. 57
It is highly unlikely that a prohibition on condominium conversions constitutes a taking under the Mahon test. Conversion regulation resembles many other restrictions on land use that have been
upheld: zoning laws furnish the clearest examples. The Supreme
Court has long held that ordinances prohibiting certain uses in certain areas are valid if enacted as part of a common plan. 58 Thus, the
standard zoning enabling act explicitly provides for land use restrictions. 59 Of course, a zoning ordinance that unduly affects a particular plot of land may be struck down if it serves no legitimate
interest,60 but condominium conversion laws serve important public
interests.61 And the economic burden upon a landlord who is not
allowed to convert is relatively small compared to other burdens that
the Supreme Court has held valid. In Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 62 for
example, the Court upheld an ordinance that forced a landowner to
abandon the use it had made of its property for many years.
The most recent judicial light on this area was shed in a case of
historic landmark regulation. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of New York, 63 the Supreme Court recognized that a city may
restrict the use of a certain property even if that restriction "destroy[s] or adversely a.ffect[s] recognized real property interests."64
56. Justice Holmes stated at one point: "One fact for consideration in determining such
limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all
cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act." 260
U.S. at 413.
57. Holmes noted that rent control laws, such as those examined in Block v. Hirsch, 256
U.S. 135 (1921), and Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921), "went to
the verge of the law," but fell short of being a taking. 260 U.S. at 416.
It does not appear that Mahon intended to overrule Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915), a case still frequently cited as an example of how far a regulation can diminish property values without constituting a taking. In Hadacheck, the City of Los Angeles outlawed the
petitioner's brickyard, which not only predated the ordinance but was also operating at that
location before the city limits expanded to include it. Despite a diminution of value from
$800,000.00 to $60,000.00, the Court held that no taking occurred.
58. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1927).
59. A copy of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act is reprinted in American Law Institute, A Model Land Development Code 210 (Tentative Draft No. 11, April 24, 1968),
60. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928),
61. See text at note 46 supra.
62. 369 U.S. 590 (1962). See also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), discussed
in note 57 supra.
63. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
64. 438 U.S. at 125. The Court explicitly rejected the pure physical encroachment test,
stating that "we do not embrace the proposition that a 'taking' can never occur unless government has transferred physical control over a portion of a parcel." 438 U.S. at 123 n.25. The
Court then identified the determinative factors for deciding whether a law results in a taking:
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are of
course relevant considerations . . . . So too is the character of the government action. A
"taking" may more readily be found when the interference with property can be charac-
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New York City had sought to prohibit Penn Central from constructing an office tower above Grand Central Station, which had been
designated a historical landmark. The Court denied Penn Central's
assertion that the prohibition amounted to an unconstitutional taking, noting that the landmark law was not an "acquisition[ ] of resources to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions" 65 and did
not interfere with the existing use of the property. In particular, the
Court noted, the landmark law allowed Penn Central to continue
using the property as it had expected to use it and to receive a reasonable return upon the land.66 Can any less be said of the average
landlord?
Although the exact contours of a taking remain vague, the deprivations imposed by conversion restrictions seem insufficient to require compensation. Obviously the regulating authority does not
physically encroach upon the landlord's apartment, and the landlord
may continue to use the property as in the past. Moreover, the burden is much less than other courts have already tolerated. Property
owners will have to look elsewhere for constitutional grounds to obstruct condominium conversion regulations.
Ill.

CONSENT PROVISIONS AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

An outraged landlord who finds no solace in the police power
and takings limitations on government activity may nonetheless raise
a potent constitutional objection if the conversion ordinance permits
conversions when tenants or neighbors consent. 67 Such an ordinance
arguably delegates government power to interested private parties,
thereby denying landlords the fourteenth amendment right to due
terized as a physical invasion by government, . . . than when interference arises from
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good.
438 U.S. at 124 (footnotes omitted). The Court also noted that when the government does not
take property for its own use or "physicially invade" it, but instead enacts police power regulations, the Court will usually uphold the law: "More importantly for the present case, in instances in which a state tribunal reasonably concluded that 'the health, safety, morals, or
general welfare' would be promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land, this
Court has upheld land-use regulations that destroyed or adversely affected recognized real
property interests." 438 U.S. at 125 (footnotes omitted).
65. 438 U.S. at 128.
66. The Court noted:
[Grand Central Station's] designation as a landmark not only permits but contemplates
that appellants may continue to use the property precisely as it has been used for the past
65 years: as a railroad terminal contaimng office space and concessions. So the law does
not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel.
438 U.S. at 136.
67. The New York ordinance, for example, required that 35% of the tenants agree to
purchase their units. See text at notes 13-17 supra. The San Francisco law requires that the
same percentage consent to the conversion. See P. ROHAN & C. BERGER, supra note 12.
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process.68 This Section pursues that argument to what is, for the
landlord, a happy conclusion.69
Modem due process analysis has two stages. First, it assesses
whether the person is being deprived of a "protected" liberty or
property interest. Then, it determines t4e process that is due that
interest. The landlord's property interest here is the free use of the
land. Although not every limitation on land use would necessarily
threaten a protected property interest,70 the common law principle
that a person may use land in any way that does not create a nuisance has been deemed to create a protected interest71 that easily
embraces the landlord's situation.
Somewhat more effort is needed to evaluate the due-ness of the
process by which a landlord is deprived of his property interest in
land use. It is well established that all rational "legislative acts"
within the police power satisfy the procedural requirements of the
fourteenth amendment.72 "Administrative acts," in contrast, pass
constitutional muster only by offering affected persons "meaningful"
safeguards,73 including notice, a hearing, and an impartial adjudicator who gives reasons for the decision. 74 Much scholarly commentary has been devoted to distinguishing legislative acts from
administrative acts,75 and several different approaches have been
suggested. By almost any standard, however, the proceedings to obtain tenant consent under condominium conversion ordinances that
require consent are administrative. The decision applies a general
68. An ironic juxtaposition arises: some laws absolutely prohibiting conversion do not violate the landlord's rights, but laws that may allow some conversions upon tenant consent are
constitutionally unsound. This attests to the constitutional importance of fair procedure. Although the nature of the prohibition does not render it invalid, the manner in which the prohibition is imposed may do so.
69. One might find the delegation of governmental authority impermissible by another
route. Federal and state constitutions grant legislative power exclusively to governmental bodies. See e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § I; MICH. CONST. art. 4, § I; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 2. Arguably, the nondelegation principle follows directly from such provisions. This Note will not
develop such an argument. Since condominium conversion laws are not delegations of United
States congressional power, no federal constitutional issue is raised; the state issue would depend on the particular state constitutional provision in dispute, and would not be of general
interest.
70. See l)eve!opments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1514 (1978) (hereinafter cited as l)evelopmentsJ.
71. See Washington ex rel Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
72. See, e.g., Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). q.
l)evelopments, supra note 70, at 1509 ("due process need not attach to legislative acts"); Comment, .Due Process Rights ofParticipation in Administrative Rulemaking, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 886,
889 (1975) ("procedural due process has been considered inapplicable to the legislative setting").
73. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
74. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970).
75. See, e.g., l K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE ch. 12 (2d ed. 1979); Cunningham, Rezoning by Amendment as an Administrative or Quasi-Judicial Act: The "New Laok" in
Michigan Zoning, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (1975); l)evelopments, supra note 70, at 1508-13.
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ordinance to a particular apartment. The group that decides - a
cluster of tenants - is not elected. The facts supporting the decision
are tenants' personal predilections, not general assumptions about
societal preferences. The decision affects an identifiable individual
- the landlord.76 Thus, the statutes delegate responsibility for an
administrative act, and the landlord seems entitled to the traditional
safeguards of procedural due process.
It seems difficult to rationalize the proposition that tenant consent provisions satisfy procedural due process requirements. The ultimate decision is delegated to a party who is intimately concerned
with and affected by its outcome. Such a delegation appears to be a
clear violation of the procedural requirement of an impartial adjudicator.
·
The landlord's contentions find some support in a trilogy of aging but still important Supreme Court cases concerning the delegation of land use decisions. In Eubank v. Richmond,77 the Court
struck down an ordinance allowing the owners of property on a
street to establish the building lines on that street.78 Five years later,
however, in Cusack v. Chicago 79 the Court upheld a law that forbade
billboard erection without the consent of nearby property owners. 80
The Court weakly distinguished Eubank by noting that the Richmond law allowed property owners to establish a new prohibition,
while the Chicago law only allowed property owners to remove an
existing prohibition. The fatuousness of this distinction became
76. For a list of "tests" that may tum on the foregoing characteristics of the decision, see
JJerelopments, supra note 70, at 1509-12.
77. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
78. In response to a state law, the City of Richmond delegated the power to establish
building lines. If the owners of two thirds of the property abutting any street agreed on a
building line, the city automatically decreed that no building should extend over that line and
prescribed fines for violations. The city government had no discretion in the matter, nor was
any review possible. Eubank erected a home with a bay window that extended over a building
line that had bee°: established after he received his permit but before construction began. He
challenged the law, contending that it deprived him "of his property without due process of
law and den[ied] him the equal protection·ofthe laws." 226 U.S. at 140. The Court agreed. It
noted that the ordinance allowed the owner of nearby property to control the property of the
plaintiff, perhaps "solely for their own interests or even capriciously:" 226 U.S. at 144. The
Court implied that it might have held differently if the ordinance had established rigid guidelines by which the property owners had to decide the location of the line, or if it had empowered the city to review the reasonableness of the designation. The Richmond ordinance,
however, "enable[d] the convenience of property owners to control the property rights of
others." 226 U.S. at 144.
79. 242 U.S. 526 (1917).
80. The case upheld a Chicago ordinance that required the consent of the owners of a
majority of the property fronting on a residential street before a billboard or signboard could
be erected on that block. The parties, once again, framed the issue in due process terms. The
Court held that since the city could (and did) prohibit the billboards absolutely, the provision
that allowed the neighbors to lift that prohibition could not injure the plaintiff. The Court
stated that "[h]e who is not injured by the operation of a law or ordinance cannot be said to be
deprived by it of either constitutional right or of property." 242 U.S. at 530.
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clear in Washington ex rel Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 81 the
final case in the trilogy. Roberge invalidated an ordinance that had
required the builders of a home for the elderly to obtain the consent
of area homeowners. 82 The Court tried to distinguish the case from
Cusack by holding that Cusack's billboard regulation had concerned
a use that threatened "the safety and decency" 83 of the neighbors,
while the home for the elderly in Roberge benefited the community.
Not surprisingly, the tension within the Roberge trilogy has
spawned some curious results in the lower courts. 84 In 1968, for example, the Delaware Supreme Court invalidated a section of the
Newark zoning law that required the consent of neighboring property owners before a "multiple dwelling" could be built, reasoning
that such consent was "repugnant to due process . . . an unlawful
delegation of legislative authority."85 A year later, the Minnesota
Supreme Court faced similar facts in O'Brien v. City of Saint Paul86
but upheld the ordinance by analogizing it to Cusack: the law was
couched in terms of lifting a prohibition, rather that imposing one.
Extraordinarily, the O'Brien court distinguished Roberge by finding
the proposed apartment building - like the Cusack billboard - to
be a use likely to cause "injury, inconvenience, or annoyance to the
community." The court thus used the Roberge language to uphold
the very situatfon that Roberge had disallowed.
Clearly, O'Brien wobbles uneasily on the foundation of Roberge
and Eubank. More significantly, however, it illustrates the theoretical instability of the Court's attempts to distinguish Cusack. By
hinging the legitimacy of a delegation on whether the ordinance requires the neighbors' initiative to remove a prohibition or to impose
one, the Supreme Court overlooked the central question of due pro81. 278 U.S. I 16 (1928).
82. The ordinance provided that "[a] philanthropic home for . . . old people shall be permitted in First Residence District when the written consent shall have been obtained of the
owners oftwo-thir:_ds of the property within four hundred (400) feet of the proposed building."
278 U.S. at 118. The plaintiff, who proposed to erect such a home without the consent of
nearby property owners, challenged the validity of the delegation provision on due process
grounds. The Court noted that the law provided no standards for the delegated decision and
supplies no means of reviewing those decisions.
83. 278 U.S. at 122.
84. In addition to the state court cases discussed in text, see, e.g., People ex rel Chicago
Dryer Co. v. City of Chicago, 413 Ill. 314, 109 N.E.2d 201 (1952); Gannett v. Cook, 245 Iowa
759, 61 N.W.2d 708 (1953); Concordia Collegiate Inst. v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189, 93 N.E.2d 201
(1952).
85. Marta v. Sullivan, 248 A.2d 608, 611 (Del. 1968). The ordinance required the developer to obtain "'approval of 75% of the residents within a radius of one-eighth mile' " before
constructing a multiple dwelling when the " 'immediate neighborhood is more than 50% developed.'" 248 A.2d at 608 (quoting Newark Zoning Ordinance§ 50l(d)).
86. 285 Minn. 378, 173 N.W.2d 462 (1969). A city ordinance required the consent of the
owners of two thirds of the property within 100 feet ofa proposed apartment building in a oneor two-family residence district.
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cess. Laws that accommodate that formalistic standard may still
permit neighbors to prohibit unwanted uses capriciously.
Moreover, Roberge's redelinition of the Cusack exception (allowing a state to delegate authority to waive a prohibition of a use
that threatens "safety and decency") does not even withstand the
Court's own analysis. In Eubank, Justice McKenna condemned the
delegation in question for letting property owners control their
neighbors' property "solely for their own interests or even capriciously."87 The Roberge Court spoke similarly.88 That analysis
should also have doomed the Cusack and O'Brien ordinances: the
motivation for a legal restriction does not affect the selfishness or
capriciousness with which interested parties may wield delegated authority. The neighbors in O'Brien might deny the right to build because they prefer the spacious feeling of an empty lot, because they
fear a decline in property values, or simply because they don't like
Mr. O'Brien.
The Cusack exception is difficult to reconcile with other constitutional settings.89 One cannot even justify it with a theory that the
beneficiaries of a use restriction are accurate, non-capricious arbiters
of when it is in their own interests to waive a prohibition.90 Society
87. 226 U.S. at 144.
88. 278 U.S. at 122.
89. As early as 1886, the Court discussed the repugnancy of arbitrary power based on
personal, rather than general, interests:
When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development,
we are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play and
action of purely personal and arbitrary power . . . . For, the very idea that one man may
be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the
enjoyment of life at the mere will of another seems to be intolerable in any country where
freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, ll8 U.S. 356, 369-70 (1886).
90. In other cases of delegation to interested parties, the Supreme Court has been vehement in its condemnation. For example, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 3ll-l2
(1936), the Court declared:
The power conferred upon the majority is, in effect, the power to re~ulate the affairs of an
unwilling minority. This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not
even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the
same business . . . . The delegation is so clearly arbitrary, and so clearly a denial of
rights safeguarded by the due process clause . . . that it is unnecessary to do more than
refer to the decisions of this court which foreclose the decision. Schechter Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. at p. 537; Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143; Seal/le Trust Co. v.
Roberge, 278 U.S. ll6, 121-122.
On the other hand, in Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. I (1939), the Court upheld the Federal
Tobacco Inspection Act against a challenge based, in part, on the delegation of power to some
of the growers and to the Secretary of Agriculture. The Act authorized the Secretary to designate those markets where tobacco moved in interstate commerce. Before he could make such a
designation, however, two thirds of the growers in the area had to approve. A designated
interstate market became subject to Department of Agriculture inspection. The Court, citing
Cusack, Roberge, and Carter, held that there was no delegation to the growers since Congress
merely withheld the operation of its own regulations until the required approval was given by
the growers. "Here it is Congress that exercises its legislative authority in making the regula-
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cannot localize the beneficiaries of laws as the Roberge treatment of
Cusack seems to suggest. A law protecting the safety or decency of a
few also affects the safety and decency of the whole society. It is
foolish to expect interested parties to appreciate all the concerns of
every fellow beneficiary of an ordinance. Furthermore, the Cusack
standard allows a state to remove the safety valve of judicial review
from delegated decisions. Ultimately, no procedural safeguards protect a grievant's interest in the fair administration of the laws.
Roberge and Eubank should be read to preserve the due process
rights of property owners.91 The general standard of Eubank, Cusack, and Roberge should be understood to prohibit all delegation of
power to restrict property use, with perhaps a minor exception for
those presenting an immediate, localized threat to safety and decency. Obviously this standard imperils statutes that condition condominium conversion upon tenant approval. In many cases, the
tion and in prescribing the conditions of its application. The required favorable vote upon the
referendum is one of these conditions." 306 U.S. at 16. The delegation of power to the Secretary was seen as merely giving him the power to ascertain a fact, and once the fact has been
ascertained, to apply the rules established by Congress. 306 U.S. at 16-17. While the Court
seems to have slipped into the evasive language of Cusack, the case can be distinguished from
the conversion problem since in Currin those subject to the regulations were given the right to
bind themselves to adherence, rather than to force adherence on another party whose interests
conflict with those of the delegates.
A more recent discussion of the delegation issue occurred in City of Eastlake v. Forest
City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976). That case decided "whether a city charter provision requiring proposed land use changes to be ratified by 55% of the votes cast [in a referendum] violate[d] the due process rights of a landowner who applies for a zoning change." 426
U.S. at 670. The Court held that the charter provision did not deny due process, distinguishing
the Eubank and Roberge delegations as not analogous to a referendum requirement:
Two decisions of this Court were relied on by the Ohio Supreme Court in invalidating
Eastlake's procedure. The thread common to both [Eubank and Roberge] is the delegation of legislative power, originally given by the people to a legislative body, and in tum
delegated by the legislature to a narrow segment of the community, not the people at large.
426 U.S. at 677 (emphasis in original).
Neither Eubank nor Roberge involved a referendum procedure such as we have in this
case; the standardless delegation of power to a limited group of property owners condemned by the Court in Eubank and Roberge is not to be equated with decision-making
by the people through the referendum process.
426 U.S. at 678. The Court characterized Cusack in a footnote as a simple waiver of "an
otherwise applicable legislative limitation." 426 U.S. at 678 n.12.
One recent case which peripherally discusses the delegation issue is Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974). In Belle Terre, the Court upheld a zoning ordinance that restricted use to "single family dwellings," and that defined "family" to exclude any group of
more than two unrelated individuals. While the case did not really present a delegation of
power issue, the Court discussed Roberge and Cusack in its review of past zoning challenges.
The Court noted that the Seattle ordinance in Roberge was invalid because property owners
could be subject to the selfish, arbitrary, or capricious will of others and because it, unlike
Cusack, did not involve an inherent threat to safety or decency. 416 U.S. at 6-7. See also
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-58 (1975) (delegation of authority to tribal council
to control sale of liquor on Indian reservation).
91. See, e.g., Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 226-28 (1937);
Havighurst, Property Owners' Consent Provisions in Zoning Ordinances, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 175
(1930); Freund, Some Inadequately JJiscussed Problems of the Law of City Planning and Zoning, 24 ILL. L. REV. 135, 142-44 (1929).
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interests of the tenants and the landlord will conflict, and overall
public interest may or may not favor conversion. 92 To expect tenants to determine whether the conversion meets the public interest is
folly; to expect them to appreciate the valid interests of the landlord
is also folly. Both sides have important interests at stake, and both
sides are entitled to an impartial consideration of those interests,
with corresponding procedural safeguards. Any condominium conversion statute delegating that consideration to the tenants by requiring their consent denies the due process rights of the owner and
offends the fourteenth amendment.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Condominium conversion laws touch the bank accounts of building owners and their tenants; those affected parties will continue to
litigate the validity of such laws. But a federal constitutional challenge is unlikely to invalidate the general concept of conversion regulation. Conversion regulations serve important social goals; to
attain these goals they impose relatively light burdens. Regulations
that require the consent of the tenants, however, deny the due process right of building owners. They offend basic concepts of procedural and substantive fairness, and therefore should not stand.

92. See, e.g., the statement oflegislative findings in the recent New York law for suburban
counties, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW§ 352-33 (McKinney Supp. 1978); the debates over the reenactment of the old New York law, see sources cited in note 13 supra; HUD REPORT, supra note l;
Condominium Hearings, supra note 17; and RHYNE, supra note 9.

